Major Democratic donor criticizes (and will not contribute to) Obama over Israel

By Michael J.W. Stickings

As the neocon Commentary (or is it Dysentery?) is (gleefully) reporting, Haim Saban, a major Democratic donor, "has indicated that he will not contribute to President Obama's reelection campaign in 2012, because of the administration's stance on Israel":

"President Obama has raised so much money and will raise so much money through the Internet, more than anybody before him. And he frankly doesn't, I believe, need any of my donations," said Saban.

"I'm very perplexed as to why the president, who's been to Cairo, to Saudi Arabia, to Turkey, has not made a stop in Israel and spoken to the Israeli people," he continued. "I believe that the president can clarify to the Israeli people what his positions are on Israel and calm them down. Because they are not calm right now."

He's probably right that Obama doesn't need his financial support, but what does he object to, that Obama hasn't visited Israel? Okay, fine, he should go to Israel sometime, but the real issue is that Obama refuses to play along with the right-wing pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., that is, to kowtow before Netanyahu and Likud, and their American allies, who seek "peace" only on terms that penalize the Palestinians and otherwise keep them in a state of submission before an enlarged Israeli state that keeps the land it has come to occupy.

Again, all the president said in his speech last week was that Israel's pre-1967 borders should be taken as a starting point for negotiations. That's it, but it was enough to enrage Netanyahu and others on the right and to turn Congress into a bunch of shameless weaklings applauding Israel's, and the Israeli lobby's, demands.

Obama deserves criticism, perhaps, for not doing enough to work for a settled peace between Israel and the Palestinians, but his position is clearly aimed at securing such a peace by acknowledging that concessions are required on both sides. Of course, Netanyahu and his allies, both in Israel and the U.S., refuse to make any concessions, or at least the sort of concessions that could actually bring about peace, which is why they are obstacles to peace regardless of whatever dishonest rhetoric they may spew.

If there is to be any progress in the region, and any long-term security for Israel, it is essential that extremist ideology of all kind be rejected in favour of a more realistic understanding of what it may take to reach a compromise that, while not necessarily perfect, will be acceptable for the most part to both sides. It's too bad Saban doesn't seem to get that.

Whatever happened to the Iran project?

Guest post by Ali Ezzatyar 

Ali Ezzatyar is a journalist and American attorney practising in Paris, France. 

(Ed. note: This is Ali's sixth guest post at The Reaction. Last month, he wrote on the Arab Spring. In March, he wrote on Obama's foreign policy and the secular uprisings in the Middle East. In February, he wrote on dictatorship in Tunisia and Egypt and on the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. In January 2010, he co-wrote a post on Iran with Bryan Tollin. I'm making him a fully-fledged contributor. Look forward to more posts from him soon. -- MJWS) 

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His beard is long and grey; he is reputed for living a rather simple life, but Israel's prime minister recently called him the greatest threat to the world. He is the Supreme Leader of Iran. As attention remains focused on Abbottabad, Iran's nuclear program continues nearby. Some are hoping that news from Damascus to Fukushima will influence events in Iran, as it fades from foreign policy's short memory. But the mullahs, and Iran's people for that matter, couldn't care less about what happens elsewhere. Now more than ever, to encourage change in the Islamic Republic, incentivized diplomacy is necessary before it's too late.

It is almost mechanical to group Iran with neighboring Arab countries, what with its share of Islamic extremism and oil. But social behavior in Iran is driven by a totally different mindset, and it won't be seeing revolution soon. For better or worse, Iranians feel a deep-rooted disassociation with the rest of the region.

An extension of its social mindset, Iranian politics is significantly different from that of its neighbors. The Iranian government, while autocratic, has traditionally been more democratic than most of the regimes around it. More importantly, the Islamic Republic is itself the product of revolution, making it more established and deeply rooted than any Arab government in the Middle East. While a week of protests in Tahrir square brought about revolutionary dominos in Egypt, weeks of uprisings in 2009 did not beget a single meaningful policy change in Iran.

And in perhaps the same way the massive protests of 2009 did not register a blip on the Arab world's radar, the Arab Spring has done and will do little to motivate Iranians, people and politicians alike. Iranians simply do not perceive countries like Egypt and Syria as trendsetters.

A proud, isolated country, Iran is stubborn about its policy, often to its own detriment. Years of debilitating sanctions demonstrate how far Iran is willing to go to preserve what it views as its sovereignty. So while much of Iran sits in a notoriously busy earthquake zone, and its nuclear plants are reportedly malfunctioning, it has recently announced that it is not apprehensive after events in Fukushima. Even the world's most established nuclear powers are rethinking their energy strategies. Yet another table for one at the Iranian gala.

The international community has long been worried that Iran would build a nuclear bomb and use it. That was never very likely. Now its neighbors are voicing concern that an earthquake in Bushehr (or elsewhere) could have similar catastrophic effects in the region. That is actually significantly more likely.

Consider that Iran today is a stable regime in a region of turmoil. It pulls strings in Afghanistan and Iraq, is buoyed by high oil prices, and has not been dissuaded from its nuclear program. What does all of this mean?

It means the Islamic Republic will continue to play by its own rules, and will only be influenced by incentives. Regime change is not likely in the short term, so the world needs to engage Iran's current government no matter how unpleasant that is. Given Iran's sensitivity to what it perceives as foreign interference, premising this engagement on an improved human rights record is unfortunately untenable.

President Obama's election platform of speaking to America's enemies, Iran being at the top of that list, was promising. Gradually, however, the crown jewel of foreign policy projects has all but slipped off the agenda.

Progress on Iran's nuclear program can be achieved with more carrots and direct diplomacy (Iran's freezing of uranium enrichment in 2004 demonstrates this is possible). There is an added bonus to such a project as well. Since only conservatives in Iran have the legitimacy to make compromise with Iran's enemies, they are likely to move toward the center of the political spectrum while doing so. The byproduct of diplomacy could be further political liberalization and even democratization. Change in Iran needs a jump start. A rigorous diplomatic project is imperative at this juncture.

Scenes from Syria

By Michael J.W. Stickings

The BBC reports on the outburst of violence by Assad's brutal regime:

At least 72 protesters have been killed by security forces in Syria, rights groups say -- the highest reported death toll in five weeks of unrest there.

Demonstrators were shot, witnesses say, as thousands rallied across the country, a day after a decades-long state of emergency was lifted.

Many deaths reportedly occurred in a village near Deraa in the south, and in a suburb of the capital, Damascus.

US President Barack Obama called for a halt to the "outrageous" violence.

"This outrageous use of violence to quell protests must come to an end now," the president said in a statement.

UK Foreign Secretary William Hague said he was "extremely concerned" by reports of deaths and casualties across Syria and urged restraint on the country's authorities.

"Political reforms should be brought forward and implemented without delay," he said. "The Emergency Law should be lifted in practice, not just in word."

That would be a start, but I just don't see that happening anytime soon. Syria isn't Egypt, where the military wanted Mubarak out after his position become untenable, and which in any event is more westernized than Syria.

Just consider what's happened: Assad lifted the state of emergency, essentially encouraging more protests, and then responded by murdering demonstrators critical of his regime.

Obama and Hague and other world leaders can say all they want. What are they actually going to do about the situation in Syria? Likely, nothing. Nothing beyond saying the right things, which is something but certainly not nearly enough. (Although Aljazeera reports that U.S. has been supporting/funding the Syrian opposition.)

The demonstrators are largely on their own, I fear. And they likely won't get far.

Here's an Aljazeera report on the protests and crackdown:

The Arab Spring midterm

Guest post by Ali Ezzatyar 

Ali Ezzatyar is a journalist and American attorney practising in Paris, France.

(Ed. note: This is Ali's fifth guest post at The Reaction. Last month, he wrote on Obama's foreign policy and the secular uprisings in the Middle East. In February, he wrote on dictatorship in Tunisia and Egypt and on the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. In January 2010, he co-wrote a post on Iran with Bryan Tollin. -- MJWS)

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It's test-time. The durability of an unpopular dictator, Arab or otherwise, has been called into question since January. Fair enough. But each bud of the Arab Spring has taught us another thing or two.

Tunisia taught us that an aura of inevitability bolstered by rhetoric from abroad could do little to help against galvanized, anti-governmental will. Egypt confirmed that Tunisia was not a fluke, with the additional lesson that years of foreign support and patronage can do little to hold a dictator and his system in place. On the flip side, Algeria is showing us how years of civil war can make a population complacent to revolution. They all demonstrate how the information age has changed politics forever. So if precedental value is important, how do we interpret Libya and Syria?

First, tribal and sectarian allegiances are obstinate, even in the face of destiny.

In February, it looked inevitable that Qaddafi would be the third dictator deposed in so many months. As the so-called Libyan rebels swallowed up government territory on their way to Tripoli, few could have predicted the stalemate that has set in today. The reality is that Qaddafi's counter-punch was engineered through a consolidation of tribal loyalties in and around Tripoli, not a regrouping of government arms. With the rebels faltering, many of Libya's tribal leaders (who have long had a "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" relationship with Qaddafi) rallied around the colonel. They have now succeeded in keeping him in power. Similarly, what we are seeing in Syria is the hardening of the core of Alavi patrons that make up the regime, with the Assad family as their figurehead. The Alavi minority, since coming to power in the mid 1960s, has been the primary power broker in that country. It stands to lose significantly more than any one group in Tunisia or Egypt ever could.

Second, an absence of meaningful diplomatic ties to world's most powerful countries actually hardens regimes and their power.

One could as easily conclude that pariah-status endangers dictators, alienating their populations and driving them to resentment. In Egypt and Tunisia, however, it was the relationships the dictatorial regimes had with democratic countries that allowed the world to exercise influence when it counted. Libya and Syria are regimes that are accountable to almost no one, whose dictators (and respective entourages) are not welcome anywhere. There is nobody to apply pressure or give incentives; the regime is left to fend for its life in the wake of rebellion. What's more, populations in isolated countries probably resent the rest of the world almost as much as they do their own regimes, which has implications for intervention of any kind.

Still, if the world had reacted to help the rebels when even the most loyal to Qaddafi would have bet against him, things could be different there today. Similarly, in countries like Syria (and Iran for that matter), there is probably much less today to the argument that isolation, with tools like sanctions and fiery rhetoric, makes for productive long-term foreign policy. A more rigorous diplomatic project in these places could have set the stage for regime change. Alas, what's done is done.

Partially on account of these lessons, one would imagine that if the regime does fall in Syria, its implications would have a particular thrust. It is the most entrenched, perhaps the most brutal, and almost certainly the most domestically popular of the large Arab dictatorships. Regime change there would usher in a certain inevitability that would echo from Riyadh to Rabat; it could mean the death knell of the Arab dictator as we know it.

Sure, this is conjecture for now. But, hey, this is just the midterm.